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Abstract
Far-right politics in Europe did not die with Adolf Hitler in 1945. In the early 21st
century, populist parties had a somewhat quiet existence beneath Europe’s political surface
and did not find much success in elections. However, as refugees and asylum seekers fled the
Syrian Civil War and North Africa beginning in 2015, and as Eastern and Central Europeans
flocked to the UK, European far-right parties found themselves with a new opportunity to
mobilize support. Now in 2020, far-right parties have become legitimate contenders in both
national parliaments and the European Parliament. The migrant crisis is perhaps one of the
most significant factors allowing for the rise of the far-right in Europe. The migrant crisis
provided an opening for far-right populist parties to attract supporters by nursing growing
xenophobic feelings and making people believe that they genuinely do need to save their
country from invasion. The Lega, Alternative for Germany, and UK Independence Party are
three strong examples of this phenomenon as they have heavily used shocking anti-immigrant
rhetoric to attract voters. By analyzing election trends, government responses to migrants,
and the parties’ use of anti-immigrant rhetoric in campaigns, this paper seeks to examine how
far-right populist parties in Italy, Germany, and the UK successfully used anti-immigrant
rhetoric based on the 2015 European migrant crisis and the influx of Eastern and Central
European migrants to the UK to find electoral success in the twenty-first century.
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Introduction
In 2015, civil war in Syria and the threat of ISIS loomed in the Middle East while the
climate crisis spurred desertification in North Africa. Over one million migrants attempted to
seek asylum in Europe in 2015 alone (Fiore and Ialongo 2018). The number of refugees and
asylum seekers who risk their lives to make the dangerous trek to Europe has continued to
grow. Millions of migrants risk the dangerous journey from Libya to the Italian coast or trek
the Balkan route through Turkey and into Greece, hoping to make their way to northern states
such as Germany (Tassinari 2016, 73). Granting the right to asylum was recognized as an
international obligation in the 1951 Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees as it
pertains to people who are escaping extreme harm and persecution. However, European
citizens in countries such as Italy and Germany have struggled to find a balance between the
humanitarian implications of the crisis and their own fears of being outnumbered in their own
country.
Even though native citizens of a country may outnumber the number of migrants
arriving by millions of people, the media tends to present migrants as coming as a “tsunami”
or “invasion” (Fiore and Ialonogo 2018). For example, in the map shown in Figure 1 in the
Appendix, the arrows showing the different routes that refugees and asylum take to reach
Europe from the Middle East or Africa almost mirror maps that depict invasions during war,
where arrows trace the movements of invading troops into foreign territory. When large
groups of people suddenly relocate to one’s native country, they might feel shocked and even
scared for their livelihood. This is particularly true if someone lives in an ethnically and
racially homogenous area of their country. To illustrate this, one scholar writes:
“A migrant inflow turns into a crisis after the citizens perceive the migrants as a threat
to normal life conditions before the government starts responding by consequential
actions though the effect of the actions is uncertain and the knowledge about the
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situation is scant…. The situation in Europe turned into a crisis situation after a large
number of citizens shared the messages of anti-immigrant groups and parties and
perceived the increasing migration wave as a threat” (Attinà 2014, 51).
Meanwhile, citizens of the United Kingdom feel as though they are experiencing a
different kind of migrant crisis. In 2004 and 2007, the European Union (EU) enlarged to
include former Soviet satellite countries in Eastern and Central Europe, such as Poland and
Romania. Making opportune use of the Schengen Agreement, which allows for the free
movement of people within the EU and permits citizens of one EU member state to live and
work in a different member state, millions of Eastern and Central Europeans flocked to the
UK in search of better job opportunities. In addition to the pull of the Schengen Agreement,
the UK’s Labour government had opted not to gradually integrate immigrants from the new
member states, unlike most other Western European governments, and instead left the UK’s
door open. Hundreds of thousands more immigrants came to the UK than the government
expected, however, thus having a similar consequence in the UK as the migrant crisis in
Germany and Italy. British nationals felt threatened, as though their land was being invaded.
Though immigrants did not harm the economy, anti-immigrant feelings rose in the UK.
There is a different threat facing Europe, a threat to democracy and humanity. Farright populist parties are continuing to gain traction in multiple European nations including
Italy, Germany, and the UK. Of course, Europe is no stranger to far-right extremism. Three
parties provide strong examples of how such ideology has been able to see a resurgence in
Europe: Italy’s Lega party, Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD), and the UK’s United
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). All three of these parties, which have existed for
decades, can be classified as far-right and populist as their Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant
platforms aim to serve and uplift only the citizens of their nation. Before the migrant crisis
and the enlargement of the EU in 2004, none of these parties had truly been legitimate
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enough to be of note. Since these events, however, the Lega, AfD, and UKIP have largely
restructured their platforms to center around anti-immigrant politics and have seen legitimate
electoral success as a result.
The existence of far-right populists and extremists in Europe cannot be attributed
solely to the migrant crisis. During the 2000s, the EU experienced no small amount of
turmoil. For example, the EU was not immune from the 2008 financial crisis, which also
provided fuel for far-right politicians.1 The migrant crisis is another large piece of the
growing far-right fabric of the EU and is perhaps one of the most significant factors allowing
for the rise of the far-right in Europe. The migrant crisis provided an opening for far-right
populist parties to attract supporters by nursing growing xenophobic feelings and making
people believe that they truly do need to save their country from invasion. By analyzing
election trends, government responses to migrants, and the parties’ use of anti-immigrant
rhetoric in campaigns, this paper seeks to examine how far-right populist parties in Italy,
Germany, and the UK successfully used anti-immigrant rhetoric based on the 2015 European
migrant crisis and the influx of Eastern and Central European migrants to the UK to find
electoral success in the twenty-first century.

Literature Review
My thesis topic is broad and can be approached in a number of different ways. There
is a great deal of reading material available pertaining to the relationship between far-right
politics and immigration. However, the far-right parties in my countries of interest, especially
in Italy and Germany, are less widely written about in the United States. As the United States
continues to navigate a new political age with its own right-wing proponent of anti-immigrant

1

For more details on how the 2008 financial crisis influenced the rise of populist parties in Europe, please refer
to “The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism” by Yann Algan, Sergei Guriev, Elias Papaioannou, and
Evgenia Passari (2017).
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rhetoric, President Donald Trump, it is valuable to have reference to similar happenings in
other countries. Therefore, I hope that my thesis will contribute to the discussion of far-right
populist and xenophobic parties in Europe.
This paper is based mainly on research gathered from academic papers and articles
from credible sources. Credible online news websites proved to be a necessary asset for this
paper due to the nature of my research. I used Fordham University’s guide to reputable news
sources to select websites to draw my research from.2 I have also based parts of this paper on
knowledge I have gained on this topic from various classes, as well as from my time
interning in London with the non-profit Student Action for Refugees. As I am focusing on the
political consequences of the 2015 European migrant crisis and the 2016 Brexit referendum, I
have limited my sources to include those from no earlier than 2010. This topic is evolving
every day. New relevant articles have come out seemingly weekly, so it has been interesting
attempting to keep up with every new development. This also speaks to the importance of
incorporating news articles from reliable sources in addition to peer-reviewed academic
articles.
Before delving into the case studies, it was necessary to read literature regarding the
general definition of right-wing populism and what right-wing populists stand for. Rightwing populism is somewhat distanced from right-wing extremism. Right-wing extremism sits
on the absolute margin of the political spectrum, often employs violence, and adopts the
“symbolism and rhetoric” of National Socialism (Baier 2016, 51). Meanwhile, right-wing
populism attempts to appear less extreme by veiling itself as a legitimate part of
parliamentary democracy (Baier 2016). Right-wing populist parties cite the “cultural
difference” between racial and ethnic groups to “camouflage their racism,” as they advocate
for cultural purity and reject cultural diversity within states (Baier 2016, 51). The current

2

https://fordham.libguides.com/FakeNews/Resources
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environment of the EU as a whole breeds right-wing radicalism. For example, the “arming of
a security and surveillance apparatus under the pretext of fighting terrorism” and the
Islamophobia which is “amplified by the media, and borders closed off to immigrants”
creates possibilities for right-wing radicals (Baier 2016, 53). Based on their focus on antiimmigrant rhetoric, AfD and the Lega Nord can be classified as right-wing populist parties.
The literature also provides a solid background on the specifics of the migrant crisis.
There are “destination” countries such as Germany and Denmark where migrants hope to
settle, “transit” countries such as Greece and Italy that act as the entry point for migrants,
“somewhat affected” countries such as Poland and Ireland which face a moderate number of
migrants, and “unaffected” countries such as Portugal, which had just eight applications per
one-hundred thousand inhabitants in 2016 (Karolewski et. al 2018). Transit and destination
countries are arguably the most affected by the migrant crisis as these countries have the most
interaction with migrants. Between 2014 and 2017, 1,766,186 migrants came to Europe by
boat alone, and 624,747 of those migrants arrived in Italy, while 13,457 died or went missing
before reaching Italian shores (Fiore and Ialongo 2018). With its proximity to the African
continent, which is just a boat ride away from southern Italy, Italy is an ideal destination
country. However, even if they did not intend to remain and settle in Italy, the sudden influx
of migrants at the border was a shock to Italian natives. Furthermore, the unfortunately steep
number of drownings and capsized boats carrying migrants placed a burden on Italy to
protect and look out for migrant vessels as human rights watchdogs set their sights on Italy.
Meanwhile, between August 2015 and October 2017, approximately 1,400,000 refugees
came to Germany (Karolewski et al. 2018, 100). Due to strong economic opportunities and a
brief period where its borders were completely open to Syrian refugees, Germany is by far
the most sought-after destination country for migrants. In the eyes of German nationals, this
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was not necessarily seen as a positive outcome. Terrorist attacks and Islamophobic opinions
served to make Germans feel more afraid for their jobs and the preservation of their culture.
Academic sources regarding the Italy case study are limited. The relevant academic
articles that did involve Italy focused not on the Lega, but rather on the migrant crisis itself
and how the government responded through search and rescue initiatives as a result of the
hundreds of migrant drownings. For example, one academic source discusses the successful
but expensive operation Mare Nostrum, which was paid for entirely by the Italian
government and was replaced by the less expensive and less effective Triton operation. In
order to find substantive research about Italian citizens’ feelings towards migrants and the
response of the Lega to the migrant crisis, I relied on credible news media from sources such
as The Guardian and The New York Times. These sources provide a great deal of information
about the Lega’s charismatic leader Matteo Salvini, who is the heart and soul of the party.
These sources also go into detail about the Lega and Salvini’s anti-immigrant platform, such
as when Salvini declared that Italy’s borders were completely closed to migrants and he held
a boat carrying migrants at port for multiple days, an action for which he was on trial in
October 2020. These articles also describe how Salvini has become masterful at using social
media to spread his ideology and gain traction among Italian voters.
The selection of academic texts regarding Germany and the Alternative for Germany
is slightly larger than that of Italy, but it is still limited. One academic article thoroughly
detailed the rise of AfD’s electoral success, from its first elections to its most recent, where it
has become much more popular amongst German voters. Similar to Italy, the academic
articles tend to focus on how Germany was affected by the migrant crisis and how the
German government responded. Research shows that a focal point regarding the rise of AfD
is the party’s use of Chancellor Angela Merkel and the EU as a scapegoat for Germany’s
problems due to Merkel’s immigration policies. News media proved useful for research
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regarding the origins of AfD and how it has used anti-immigrant rhetoric to attract voters in
the wake of the migrant crisis, such as through blatantly anti-immigrant, anti-Merkel, antiEU, and Islamophobic campaign posters leading up to the 2017 German General Election.
In comparison to Italy and Germany, there are more pertinent academic papers about
the UK. This is likely due to the fact that Brexit was and still is a salient issue for five years.
However, news articles were still incredibly useful. Additionally, this is the case study that I
had the most existing knowledge about. The academic articles provide data about Brexit and
the Leave voter demographics. One source focuses on the ethnic discrimination and hate
crimes exhibited towards Eastern European migrants, specifically Polish migrants, leading up
to and following the Brexit referendum. This source described a number of frightening events
that highlight how UKIP and the leave campaign’s xenophobic rhetoric inspire violent and
racist actions. The news articles provided useful information about the history of UKIP.

Methodology
There are a number of European countries with far-right populist parties emerging as
legitimate parties, which made settling on three countries to focus on a difficult task. Poland,
for example, would make for another interesting case study with its recent headfirst descent
into the realm of populism. However, I chose to focus on Italy (Lega), Germany (Alternative
for Germany), and the UK (United Kingdom Independence Party). Italy and Germany are
bookends of the migrant crisis in Europe: one is the country that migrants enter through, and
the other is the most attractive country for migrants to settle in. Therefore, I thought it would
be interesting to focus on the anti-immigrant politics of two countries that have played
different roles in the crisis. Furthermore, I think it is important to consider the rise of
populism in Germany in the shadow of Hitler and the Nazi party.
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Regarding the UK, instead of the 2015 migrant crisis, I focus on the effects of EU
expansion and subsequent Eastern and Central European migration to the UK. This ultimately
culminated in Brexit, which has been an ongoing topic of international interest since 2016.
By analyzing the UK, I will be able to bring all of my findings together in the discussion to
compare and contrast the effects of two different migrant crises in Europe: the migrant crisis
which began in 2015 stemming from the Syrian civil war and crises in Africa, and the
millions of Eastern European migrants settling in the UK from within the EU.
For all three case studies, I discuss how the existing government responded to the
migrant crisis, the background of the far-right party in question, and how the party has
capitalized on the blunders of those governments to encourage xenophobic views among
voters and gain success. To do this, I researched accounts of government and public reactions
to the migrant crises, election results, and accounts of xenophobic policies. In the case of
Italy and the UK, I also researched how social media has played a role in the success of the
populist parties. This allowed me to have a better understanding of how, exactly, these parties
were able to manipulate the migrant crisis into an opportunity for unprecedented success.
I am limited by the length of this paper. This is a rich topic, and each case study could
have its own thesis dedicated solely to it. If I had the time and words available to interview
migrants in Italy, Germany, and the UK and supporters of these parties, I would. However, I
am limited to my research through readings. I am also limited by language barriers. I am able
to read and understand Italian, and while I may miss some nuances, I have been able to look
at Italian sources and understand the general sentiment of the Italian people and media
towards this topic. However, I cannot read German, which means that I cannot enjoy the
same breadth of material as I can with the Italy and UK case studies. However, there is
enough material available in English that my thesis should be able to address the most
relevant points.
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Italy
The Italian Government’s Crisis Response
As migrants made the often-fatal journey by boat across the Mediterranean from
Libya to Italy, much of Italy’s response to the migrant crisis has been defined by the
unfortunate number of drownings that have happened on this route. In 2013, a boat carrying
approximately five hundred migrants capsized. In response, the centrist Italian government
launched a search-and-rescue initiative called “Mare Nostrum” (Tassinari 2016). In 2014,
Mare Nostrum proved to be successful as more that 130,000 migrants were saved from
drowning. However, the high monthly cost of ten million euros forced Italy to stop the
initiative after just one year (Tassinari 2016). Though Italy had assumed that other EU states
would help pay for Mare Nostrum since Italy perceived migrants to be a “continent-wide
problem,” no other country contributed to the payment (Tassinari 2016, 75). To replace Mare
Nostrum, the EU began a much smaller operation called “Triton,” which had only one third
of Mare Nostrum’s budget and could only operate within 30 miles of Italy’s coast (Tassinari
2016). Though more cost efficient, Triton proved to be less effective than Mare Nostrum.
Eventually, the Italian government, particularly Marco Minniti of the centrist
Democratic Party, did take a restrictive approach to the migration. Minniti made an
agreement with the government of Libya that aimed to stop migrants from leaving Libya in
the first place, tried to “discredit the work of non-governmental organisations working to
rescue migrants,” and claimed that the crisis was putting “democracy in danger” (Torelli
2018). In an EU-approved deal, Minniti and the Libyan government increased the size of the
Libyan coast guard, essentially militarized tribesmen who have preside over the country’s
southern border, and convinced clan militias to stop migrant boats from leaving Libya’s
shores (“Italy’s Dodgy Deal” 2017). Furthermore, the deal allocated money to Libyan mayors
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to make up for any profits lost from a decrease in migrant trafficking (“Italy’s Dodgy Deal”
2017).
Though Minniti claims that he never made any direct payments to Libyan militias or
traffickers in exchange for preventing migrants from leaving Libya, it is widely believed that
Italian (and EU) funds were granted to them (“Italy’s Dodgy Deal” 2017). From a human
rights perspective, Minniti’s deal is suspicious as the money could be used to arm Libya’s
violent factions and rewards traffickers who commit horrifying human rights abuses, such as
torturing migrants and selling them into slavery (“Italy’s Dodgy Deal” 2017). Shady as it
may be, the deal did reduce the magnitude of migrants leaving Libya and entering Italy. With
Minniti’s leadership and the agreement with Libya, the number of migrants arriving
decreased by approximately 87 percent between 2017 and 2018 (“Italy’s Dodgy Deal” 2017).
Though Italian agreement with Libya might have been controversial to humanitarians, the
effects of it were received well in Italy itself, and set up the population to be open to an even
more aggressive approach to tackling the country’s migrant dilemma.

The Lega Background
Lega Nord is Italy’s primary far-right populist party, and was renamed simply the
Lega in 2018. It has held seats in the Italian Parliament since 1992, and was headed by the
same man, Roberto Maroni, until 2013 (“Factsheet” 2020). As a populist party, one of the
main focuses of the Lega’s platform is, of course, the Italian people. Furthermore, the Lega
stands for federalism. As the party’s original name would suggest, the Lega was especially
committed to northern Italy. In Italy, there is a significant cultural and even economic divide
between northern Italy and southern Italy. Rooted in the wealthier northern Padania region,
the Lega initially called for complete separatism between the regions, then wanted complete
autonomy in Padania, and finally settled to seek a federalist system between the regions
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(Wolfling 2011). In addition to this, the Lega also sought devolution between provinces,
meaning that some provinces would have a disproportionate amount of power in comparison
to other provinces (Wolfling 2011). Such devolution would further separate the north from
the south.
In 2013, the Lega’s current leader, Matteo Salvini, took over. In the 2010s and into
the 2020s, the party truly centers around Salvini, who is a charismatic leader. For example, in
addition to changing the name to the Lega in 2018, the party also tacked on the slogan
“Salvini premier,” which translates to “Salvini for Prime Minister” (“Factsheet” 2020). In the
2018 general election, the Lega became the third-largest party and also formed a coalition
with another prominent far-right party, the Five Star Movement, as well as the more centrist
Democratic Party (“Factsheet” 2020). Therefore, Salvini became one of the two Vice Prime
Ministers as well as Minister of the Interior (“Factsheet” 2020). Salvini shifted the Lega’s
ideological core from a focus on regional separatism and northern Italian supremacy to
nativism and populism for Italians in general. This is reflected in the party’s name change in
2018, which became more inclusive for all of Italy. Instead of pointing fingers at Rome and
southern Italy as the enemy, the party turned its focus to the “totalitarian” EU (Albertazzi et
al. 2018). By easing up on the southern Italy and no longer emphasizing the divide between
north and south, the Lega was able to truly appeal to a greater number of Italians and
therefore attract more supporters.
The Lega found great success in the late-2010s. Though it earned approximately six
percent of the vote in the 2014 European Parliament election and placed fourth, it earned
approximately 34 percent of the vote in 2019 and placed first (“Factsheet” 2020). Since 2019,
the Lega has continued to have a strong block of supporters. As Figure 2, which depicts the
election results of the Italian parliament’s Lower House in 2019 shows, the Lega earned the
second-highest number of seats (125). The winningest party, the Five Star Movement (216
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seats), is another far-right populist movement in Italy, though it is regarded as somewhat less
extreme than the Lega. This speaks to the growing popularity of populism among Italian
voters.

The Lega and Migration
The Lega gained more attention and support when Salvini, nearly immediately into
his term as interior minister, forced the Aquarius, a ship which was operated by the non-profit
SOS Méditerranée and was carrying over 600 African refugees, to turn back (Stille 2018).
International media sources regarded this as a highly controversial and problematic move.
Some even declared it to be a huge international relations blunder on Salvini’s part. However,
many Italians applauded Salvini’s order. Following the incident, support for the Lega
increased from 18 percent to 30 percent, jumping ahead of the Five Star Movement. Salvini
earned the highest approval ratings among all Italian politicians (Stille 2018). Salvini’s
decision to block the Aquarius from docking was truly a response to the EU providing little
help with Mare Nostrum and the migrant crisis in general. Salvini claimed that Malta should
take in the migrants, but this was rejected since the ship was in Tunisian waters which falls
under Italy’s jurisdiction (Torelli 2018). By doing this, Salvini sought to create a
disagreement with the EU in protest against the EU’s treatment of Italy during the migrant
crisis (Torelli 2018).
Since the Aquarius incident, Salvini has kept the Lega’s focus on nativism and has
continued to use anti-immigrant messaging as the primary tool to do so. In comparison to
other parties in the Italian Parliament, the Lega places a greater emphasis on the allegedly
too-relaxed migrant management by Italy’s previous governments (Torelli 2018). Evidently,
Minniti’s deal with Libya did not satisfy Salvini, who believes that Italy’s borders should be
completely closed to migrants. In addition to shuttering Italian ports to NGO rescue vessels,
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Salvini also passed a law permitting the seizure of vessels and fines to operators of up to
57,000 euros (Roberts 2020). Salvini has taken a number of steps to ensure that a few
migrants as possible make their way to Italian land.
In July 2019, Salvini once again stopped migrants from disembarking a boat
belonging to the Italian coast guard and reaching Italian soil. Salvini’s actions towards the
131 migrants who were docked at a port in Catania, Sicily for five days caught the attention
of the Italian Senate (Messia et al. 2020). The Senate voted to revoke Salvini of the legal
immunity Salvini enjoyed as a member of the chamber, which gave Sicilian officials the
opportunity to charge Salvini and face him in court (Messia et al. 2020). Salvini is officially
charged with aggravated kidnapping, and his trial that could end with him facing 15 years in
jail began in early October 2020 (Roberts 2020).
However, Salvini is using the trial as an opportunity to continue to rally Italians
against migrants. Salvini says that his actions “defended the honor of Italy” (Roberts 2020).
The Lega is marketing the trial as a “festival,” and has instructed supporters to buy plane
tickets to Catania to discuss immigration and security issues with members of other far-right
parties (Roberts 2020). Regarding the trial, Salvini said, “Let’s make it so my trial on Sunday
morning is an opportunity for learning, reflection, ideas and plans for the future of the
country, making Catania for these few days the European capital of freedom” (Roberts 2020).
The Lega, its supporters, and other far-right Italian political parties are viewing the trial as a
verdict on whether some officials think that it is illegal to “protect” the country from illegal
immigrants. Regardless of the outcome, the trial will rally the Lega’s supporters.
The Lega has remained Italy’s favored party, which demonstrates the effectiveness of
its anti-immigrant approach and the general sentiment of the population towards migrants,
which allowed the Lega to truly rise to power in the 2010s. However, the Lega and Salvini’s
popularity has slightly decreased, with Salvini’s approval rating dropping 10 points between
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2019 and 2020 (Roberts 2020). Despite this, pollsters report that the majority of Italians,
including some who do not vote for the Lega, support Salvini’s extreme approach to
migration (Roberts 2020). Therefore, this trial is almost a gift for Salvini and the Lega. The
trial has returned migration issues to the front and center of Italian political discussion, which
serves to reignite the Lega’s base and xenophobic feelings in Italy (Roberts 2020).

Xenophobia and Islamophobia: The Lega
Since Salvini’s takeover of the party, the Lega has amplified its xenophobic and
Islamophobic position (“Factsheet” 2020). Following the European Parliament election in
2019, the Lega co-founded Identity and Democracy, an anti-Muslim and far-right
parliamentary group (“Factsheet” 2020). The Lega uses an “ethnonational definition” to
“describe the in-group and the people that the party wants to defend and represent… and
those deemed to be enemies of the party and the state” (“Factsheet” 2020). In the case of
Italy, the “in-group” are Italians, and the “enemies” are all other people, as in people who are
not Italian, European, or Christian. This sentiment is even stronger for Muslim people and
migrants who the Lega view as “endorsing a culture completely different from both Italy’s
and Europe” (“Factsheet” 2020). Salvini promised a “mass cleaning, street by street,
neighborhood by neighborhood” of migrants (Fiore and Ialongo 2018). He has also expressed
the belief that brown migrants are erasing Italy’s white population. To demonstrate their
commitment to Italian nationals, the Lega adopted their infamous motto: aiutiamo i popoli a
casa loro, which translates to “let’s help the people in their own country” (Verbeek and
Zaslove 2017, 13). This is perhaps one of the Lega’s most blatant displays of xenophobia and
establishes a clear “us versus them” dynamic.
Salvini and the Lega’s animosity towards migrants is closely tied to Islamophobic
attitudes. In 2014, Salvini even released a manifesto entitled the “People’s League,” which
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called for a ban on all mosques in Italy and stated that Muslim people are “trying to impose a
way of life incompatible with [Italians]” (“Factsheet” 2020). Once again, this behavior
creates a clear us versus them dynamic and otherizes Muslim people in Italy. The Lega paints
Muslim men as sex offenders, and some towns that are led by Lega officials prohibit women
from wearing the niqab and hijab, despite the fact that creating such an ordinance is unlawful
(“Factsheet” 2020). Furthermore, although Islam is the largest religious minority in Italy, it is
not a recognized religion, meaning that mosques receive no public funding and that no
Muslim holidays are officially recognized (“Factsheet” 2020).
Figure 3 shows Salvini giving a speech while on the campaign trail in 2018 with two
Lega posters surrounding him. The red poster on the wall calls for Italians to “stop the
invasion.” Though the poster does not explicitly say it, one can infer that it is referring to the
“invasion” of migrants. Therefore, while perpetuating the image of migrants as being
invaders encroaching on Italian territory, this poster also sends the urgent message that
Italians must vote (for the Lega, of course) if they wish to fight against this invasion.
Additionally, the blue poster on the podium reads “Italians first.” This clearly
promotes the Lega’s “Italy first” viewpoint. Italian money should only go to Italians, and
Italians should only follow Italian law- they certainly should not follow the EU, the
organization that abandoned them during the peak of the migrant crisis. The Lega believes
that Italians must help themselves before helping others, such as migrants.
Meanwhile, Figure 4 shows a sign posted at the port of Trapani in Sicily, which is a
popular entry point for migrants. The sign reads, “Stop immigration. Let’s defend the nation.”
This sign was not painted by the Lega, but rather by an Italian neo-Nazi group. Far-right
extremists have been inspired and invigorated by the Lega and Salvini’s fervent xenophobic
stance, which has drawn them to be more vocal about their xenophobic views themselves.
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Populism and Social Media: The Lega
With the advent of social media, political leaders have taken to platforms such as
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter to garner attention and spread their message. Salvini is one
example of one such political leader. While Donald Trump has Twitter, Salvini reigns over
Facebook (Stille 2018). In 2015, Salvini tripled his following on Facebook by “capitalizing
on the refugee crisis and growing discontent with Matteo Renzi’s centrist government” (Stille
2018). In Figure 5, Salvini demonstrates his support for President Trump by wearing a
“Trump 2020” face mask at a protest in Rome. Italians have been made to believe that there
are many more migrants in Italy than there actually are. It is commonly believed that
migrants comprise 30 percent of the population when in reality, they only comprise 9 percent
(Torelli 2018).
Italians have bought into the populist understanding of the refugee crisis, which
makes migration appear to be a threatening invasion. Instead of losing followers after making
controversial and problematic statements, Salvini’s following merely grows. For example, his
number of Facebook followers spiked in 2016 when he declared that Pope Francis welcoming
immigrants would “encourage and fund an unprecedented invasion” (Stille 2018). As of
August 23, 2020, Salvini has approximately 1.3 million followers on Twitter and over 4.6
million followers on Twitter. This demonstrates the wide reach of his often xenophobic and
Islamophobic messaging.
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Germany
Germany’s History with Extremist Parties
Before delving into an analysis of the recent rise of populism in Germany, it is
important to make note of the surprising popularity of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in
historical context. In the mid-1900s, Germany hosted Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist
German Workers’ Party, or Nazi Party, which is one of the most infamous extremist parties
in history. Since World War II, Germany has been extremely careful so as not to repeat such
a gross violation of human rights. For example, the Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution seeks to protect Germany against neo-Nazism and the emergence of political
parties that might “threaten Germany’s democracy” (Bennhold 2020). The German
government is cognizant of the fact that right-wing extremism and extremist violence is a
threat to German democracy. In fact, no right-wing populist or extremist party had been able
to establish a footing or relevancy in Germany since the end of World War II, until 2013 with
the emergence of AfD (Decker 2016). In March 2020, the Federal Office for the Protection of
the Constitution issued a warning against AfD and placed some of the party’s highest-ranking
officials under surveillance (Bennhold 2020). The Central Council of Jews in Germany stated
that AfD’s “entry into Parliament had confirmed its worst fears about a resurgence of the far
right” (Eddy 2017). As AfD claimed that it would “restore law and order and a sense of
national pride” in the wake of the economic and refugee crises, some Germans were
concerned with its similarity to nationalist rhetoric (Eddy 2017). In fact, protests against
AfD’s homage to nationalism took place in major cities across Germany, including Berlin,
Hamburg, Frankfurt, and Cologne (Eddy 2017). AfD’s growing popularity in the face of a
population that is deeply aware of Germany’s past and has avoided far-right parties for
decades speaks to how deeply German’s felt they were affected by the migrant crisis.
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Angela Merkel and German Government’s Response
Before the migrant crisis of 2015, Germany received the most asylum applications of
all European countries. For example, in 2014, it received 202,000 applications (Tassinari
2016). Because of this, German Chancellor Angel Merkel of the center-right Christian
Democratic Union took a more conservative approach to migration issues. In 2013, Merkel
denied calls for help from southern European countries who were beginning to face an influx
in migrant arrivals and said that Germany needed to be restrictive in terms of its migrant
intake (Tassinari 2016). This is a stark contrast to Merkel’s approach to the migrant crisis in
2015. In August 2015, Merkel announced Germany’s humanitarian and controversial offer to
refugees who had fled the Civil War in Syria. Merkel announced that Germany was
implementing an open-door policy, meaning that its borders were open to all Syrian refugees
who wished to seek asylum in Germany (Tassinari 2016). During this announcement, Merkel
made a declaration that became infamous: “we can handle this” (Karolewski et al. 2018,
102).
Evidently, Germany could not handle it. Between August 2015 and October 2017,
approximately 1,400,000 refugees came to Germany (Karolewski et al. 2018, 100). The opendoor policy was not sustainable, and Germany was forced to reinstate its border control as it
quickly became overwhelmed by the high number of refugees entering the country (Tassinari
2016). Merkel’s open-door policy also fostered tension between Germany and other EU
member states such as Greece, Italy, and Hungary as the increased number of migrants
hoping to reach Germany still had to enter Europe through one of these states. Merkel had not
consulted with any of these states before announcing Germany’s new migration policy
(Karolewski et al. 2018).
Overwhelmed by the sheer number of asylum seekers in Germany and seeing no end
in sight, Merkel sought out a deal with Turkey in 2016. The deal, which like Minniti’s deal
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between Italy and Libya was highly controversial, stated that all migrants who arrived in
Greece and were deemed unlikely to be granted asylum in Europe would be returned to
Turkey (Tassinari 2016). Turkey, in turn, would receive a total of six billion euros in aid, as
well as the possibility of a no-visa deal between Turkey and the EU and a “refugee swap”
where the EU would take in one refugee in Turkey for each refugee who was turned away in
Greece (Tassinari 2016). Merkel’s series of controversial decisions in response to the migrant
crisis provided AfD with an opening to place blame on the Chancellor and fortify their base
of supporters.

Alternative for Germany Background
AfD emerged as a relevant political party in Germany in 2013. Alexander Gauland,
Konrad Adam, and Bernd Lucke are AfD’s founders, though Lucke was replaced by Faruke
Petry as party head (“How the Alternative for Germany” 2018). However, Petry exercised too
much power, and Gauland and Jörg Meuthen replaced her (“How the Alternative for
Germany” 2018). As of 2020, Gauland and Meuthen still head the party. AfD’s leaders have
expressed some fringe views, such as when Gauland boasted that World War II and the Nazi
Party was merely a “speck of bird shit” on the history of Germany (“How the Alternative for
Germany” 2018). AfD’s leaders are members of the elite class and are diverse. For example,
Alice Weidel speaks fluent Mandarin and raises her children with her female partner (Eddy
2017). This contradicts what one might assume leaders of a far right-wing party might look
like.
During the mid-2000s, the EU experienced a significant economic crisis which left
millions of Europeans in debt. As this crisis bred Euroscepticism, it gave AfD a prime
opportunity to enter the political scene (Decker 2016). The Christian Democratic Union had
moved further to the left, leaving more center and right-wing voters to feel “abandoned”
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(Decker 2016, 10). Drawing upon German people’s frustration with the ruling Christian
democrats and liberal party, AfD touted “liberal economic policies and a conservative social
agenda” (Decker 2016, 1). Though the party did relatively well in the 2014 election,
infighting within the party caused their numbers to drop (Decker 2016). Many of the
founding members of AfD had been members of Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic
Union, which falls in the center-right of the political spectrum (Eddy 2017). They became
frustrated by Merkel’s plan to use German taxpayer money for a bailout of Greece, which
struggled greatly in the wake of the economic crisis (Eddy 2017). Germans felt as though
they had been swindled out of their own money to help a country a thousand miles away from
them. Some Germans felt growing resentment and distrust towards the EU, which is known
as Euroscepticism. AfD was able to capitalize off of this Euroscepticism and call Germans
away from Merkel and the Christian Democratic Union.

Alternative for Germany and Migration
While the economic crisis gave AfD a window to become relevant, AfD did not truly
“regain its electoral fortunes” until two years later with the refugee crisis (Decker 2016, 1).
Similar to how Eurosceptic ideals rose in Germany as a result of the Euro crisis, xenophobic
and Islamophobic ideals rose as a result of the refugee crisis. Recognizing the upward trend
towards right-wing ideals and an emphasis on national identity, AfD saw another opening to
grow their base (Decker 2016). In this way, the refugee crisis can be considered an
“unexpected gift” for AfD as it “grew into a mouthpiece and almost sole medium of protest
for a population deeply unsettled by uncontrolled migrant streams” (Decker 2016, 10).
AfD was also able to capitalize on terrorist attacks committed by Islamic extremists
around the same time of the height of the migrant crisis, such as the attacks in Paris, as well as
a spike in sexual assaults being done by North Africans on New Year’s Eve in Cologne (Decker
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2010). For example, the AfD ad in Figure 6 says, “The tracks left by the world chancellor in
Europe,” referring to Merkel, and lists various terrorist attacks that were carried out in Europe
and the number of people who died as a result of each. Therefore, this poster suggests that these
attacks, and consequently these deaths, are the result of Merkel’s open-door policy.
The migration crisis made native Germans feel both insecure and anxious about their
place in the nation. Insecurity refers to the social side effects of the sudden influx of migrants,
such as “apprehensions about a deprivation in wealth” (Decker 2016, 11). Some of the
German population felt anxiety stemming from “emotions of cultural alienation, the loss of a
familiar social order and its moorings” (Decker 2016, 11). When these feelings of insecurity
and anxiety are combined, Germans seek to limit welfare and government services to German
nationals, excluding migrants that are not German nationals. This phenomenon is referred to
as “welfare chauvinism” (Decker 2016, 11).
A number of Germans were particularly displeased with Merkel’s open-door policy
and overall response to the refugee crisis. In the year following her decision to open
Germany’s border, in the midst of a series of small-scale Islamist terrorist attacks in
Germany, Merkel’s popularity rating fell 30 points to 45 percent (Barkin 2017). At
appearances, Merkel is often met with jeers with anti-immigrant messages (Barkin 2017).
AfD was quick to capitalize on the German people’s disdain. Weidel promised to “initiate a
parliamentary investigative committee against Angela Merkel” as AfD questioned the legality
of Merkel’s migration policies (Eddy 2017). Furthermore, AfD “promised to increase border
security, to push back against further European Union integration and to oppose the use of
German taxpayer money to bail out foreign banks” (Eddy 2017). Essentially, AfD promised
to enact policy that appears opposite to Merkel’s.
The March 2016 state elections proved to be AfD’s most successful election at that
point, demonstrating the success of AfD’s anti-immigrant rhetoric. For example, in the
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Saxony-Anhalt region, AfD won 24.2 percent of the vote- the highest percentage ever won by
a “right-wing populist or extremist party” in the German state elections (Decker 2016, 10).
AfD’s percentages of the vote in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate were also in
the double digits (Decker 2016). More impressively, “a quarter of the AfD’s electorate in
Baden- Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate and even a third in Saxony-Anhalt was made
up of voters that had not taken part in previous elections,” solidifying itself as the “primary
profiteer of the increasing politicization precipitated by the refugee crisis that drove up
turnout by around ten percentage points in all three states” (Decker 2016, 10).
In the 2017 election, where Merkel was voted into her fourth term, AfD won
approximately six million votes, with 1.2 million coming from Germans who had neglected
to vote in prior elections (Eddy 2017). Furthermore, AfD took another million votes away
from people who had historically voted with Merkel, including voters from the Christian
Social Union and the Christian Democratic Union (Eddy 2017). However, AfD did not only
pull from the right and the center-right. It earned approximately 500,000 votes from leftleaning Germans who had previously voted for the Social Democrats and an additional
400,000 from people who had voted for the Left Party (Eddy 2017). Evidently, AfD’s voters
hail from every end of the political spectrum. In a time when millions of Germans felt as
though their representatives had failed them and that Germany was losing its place in an
“increasingly globalized world,” AfD had succeeded in advertising itself as the party for the
people (Eddy 2017). The following map in Figure 7 shows AfD’s success in each state in the
2019 state elections. As the graphic shows, AfD continued to perform well in Saxony.

Xenophobia and Islamophobia: AfD
“Leitkultur” is a German word meaning “core” or “guiding” culture. AfD promotes
the concept of Letikultur in the way that it rejects “relativist multiculturalism” and believes
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that German traditions and the German language should be the backbone of German identity
and are “central to the cohesion of German society” (Gedmin 2019). In an attempt to gain
support by preying on and amplifying German people’s xenophobia, AfD heavily uses
Islamophobic messaging. Letikultur can also be taken to mean “an obligation of newcomers
to show allegiance to democracy and rule of law, political pluralism and secularism”
(Gedmin 2019). Germans across the political spectrum place great importance on secularism
in particular, which gives entities like AfD opportunity to capitalize on Islamophobic
tendencies. Some Germans have long questioned the place for Islam within German culture
and society (Gedmin 2019). When Merkel and other Chancellors have used “inclusive
language” when speaking about Muslims, AfD has opposed it, stating that Islam is “a religion
that does not respect the constitution and laws of the country and is not compatible with
German democracy” (Eddy 2017). In 2016, Petry went as far as saying that police officers
could “open fire on asylum seekers trying to cross German borders” as a “last resort” (Faiola
2016). AfD has not kept its thoughts on Islam and Muslim people a secret.
AfD has historically partnered with the Pegida movement, which stands for “Patriotic
Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident” (Decker 2016). Pegida seeks to stop
immigrants from settling in Germany and feels as though Muslim immigrants in particular
are soiling German culture. Pegida regularly stages protests across Germany, and they have
spread throughout Europe. They are seen as extremist, and the protests can turn violent.
Initially, AfD distanced itself from Pegida due to how extreme the movement is. However, as
AfD found its base and leaned more into being outwardly anti-immigrant and Islamophobic,
it became more aligned with Pegida. Furthermore, in 2013, 76 percent of AfD voters noted
that they understood and agreed with Pegida’s anti-Muslim protests (Decker 2016).
Figures 8 and 9 are a series of posters from a 2017 AfD anti-immigrant and
Islamophobic ad campaign. Figure 8, which shows a pregnant woman, reads, “New
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Germans? We’ll make them ourselves.” This sends a clear message that AfD’s Germany is
not welcome to “outsiders,” and that it is not welcome to any diversity. This ad also has a
strong nativist sentiment and ties into Leitkultur. Figure 9 is an ad depicting two women
wearing swimsuits. It reads, “Burkas? We’d rather wear bikinis,” which is a clear reference to
the religious garb that many Muslim women wear. Fitting in with the trends of AfD, this ad
deepens the divide between white Germans who do not practice Islam by pointing out the
differences between the cultures.
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The United Kingdom
EU Expansion in 2004 and the UK Government’s Response
In 1973, the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC), which would
eventually become the EU with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. In 1975, there was a
referendum introduced by the New Labour government to ratify Britain’s membership in the
EEC, which divided the parties and people within the parties between those who were proEurope and anti-Europe. In general, those on the right of the Conservative party and those on
the left of the Labour party were against Europe. In 1997, Tony Blair and the economically
and culturally liberal New Labour party came to power.3
In 2004, ten more countries joined the EU. Eight of these were former USSR satellites
in Central and Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia. Existing EU member states in the Western Europe approached this
expansion differently. France and Germany, for example, opted for a gradual integration
approach that took place over the course of seven years so that French and German voters
would not be completely overwhelmed by a sudden influx in Eastern European migrants
(Ker-Lindsay 2015). Blair and the New Labour government, however, predicted that these
migrants would lead to quick industrial and economic growth, and therefore opened up its
borders immediately. Assuming that the other Western European member states were also
going to open their borders, the UK government predicted that there would be less than
20,000 migrants coming to the UK. Instead, over 100,000 migrants from the new member
states started moving to the UK every year (Portes 2016). These immigrants did indeed bring
economic prosperity, did not increase unemployment, did not “steal” jobs from British
nationals, and increased wages (“The Fiscal Impact” 2018). In 2007 when the EU expanded
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For further information regarding the UK’s history with the EU, please refer to “THE UK AND EUROPEAN
‘CENTRE FORMATION’ FROM 1950 TO BREXIT” by Christopher Lord (2018).
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again to include Romania and Bulgaria, the UK government opted for the seven-year gradual
approach (Portes 2016). However, the Conservatives were able to argue that Labour had truly
dropped the ball regarding Eastern European immigration, and Labour subsequently was
voted out of power in 2010, when the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats formed a
coalition government.
Perhaps the most visible effect the immigrants had on the UK was how they changed
the cultural makeup of the UK. In 2019, there were an estimated 3.6 million EU-born
migrants living in the UK, which equates to 5.5% of the total population of the UK (“EU
Migration to and from”). Of these 3.6 million EU-born migrants, most hailed from Poland,
with Romania and Ireland taking the second and third rankings (“EU Migration to and
from”). This represents the greatest amount of migration into the UK from people coming
from countries other than British Commonwealth countries that the UK has seen. Outside of
London and some of the UK’s more metropolitan areas, much of the UK was very
homogenous. Therefore, the sudden and intense arrival of Eastern European (especially
Polish) culture in these areas of the UK caused a kind of culture shock for the British
nationals who were already living there. Some of these people felt as though British culture
was being infringed upon and eroded, which, similar to the Lega and AfD, provided an
opening for UKIP to rise in power. The map in Figure 10 shows how the EU has expanded
over time, from the original member states marked in yellow to the Eastern and Central
European countries which became member states in 2004 marked in light brown. Note that
Bulgaria and Romania became member states in 2007, which was the most recent change to
the EU’s size until Brexit.
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UKIP Background
Though it was named the Anti-Federalist League at its founding in 1991, the party
was renamed the “United Kingdom Independence Party” (UKIP) in 1993. It was established
with the mission of removing the UK from the EU (Sutcliffe 2012). The party was a result of
when its founder, Alan Sked, campaigned against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty
(Sutcliffe 2012). In 2006, however, founding member Nigel Farage officially took over as
leader. Farage stayed in power until 2016 (with one brief break), and he is now the leader of
the Brexit party. Under Farage’s leadership, UKIP’s platform expanded to focus heavily on
immigration and appealed to white, British nationals in the working class (Sutcliffe 2012).
Therefore, its members are mainly white, older, and members of the working class.
As it capitalized on growing anti-immigrant views in the UK, UKIP saw its first true
electoral win in the 2004 European Parliament election. In this election, UKIP won over 16
percent of the vote and 12 Members of the European Parliament, putting it in third place
(Sutcliffe 2012). The party found even more success in the 2009 European Parliament
election when it won 16.5 percent of the vote and an additional seat, thus placing second to
the Conservative Party. This was particularly significant as these results made the Labour
Party, which was in power at the time, drop to third place (Sutcliffe 113).
UKIP is a Eurosceptic party, which refers to general opposition of the EU and
European integration. There is both “hard” and “soft” Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism
can be defined as complete opposition of the EU and European integration and general entails
having a platform demanding a member state’s withdrawal from the EU (Sutcliffe 2012).
Meanwhile, soft Euroscepticism refers to opposition to specific policies, policy outcomes,
and institutional aspects of the EU. Soft Eurosceptics also seek EU reform rather than its
complete dissolution (Sutcliffe 2012). UKIP falls under the hard-Eurosceptic definition as it
is extremely critical of the EU and calls for the return of power in decision making to British
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people and the British political system, rather than the governing EU institutions (Sutcliffe
2012). It follows that most of UKIP’s policies have an underlying thread of Euroscepticism.
For example, it believes that the UK should have more autonomous control over its own
fishing grounds beyond the rules of the EU’s common fisheries policy and that withdrawing
from the EU would allow the UK to save money (Sutcliffe 2012).

UKIP and Xenophobia: Brexit
Citizens and popular media in the UK have historically viewed continental Europe as
the “other” (Sutcliffe 2012). These citizens feel strongly connected to Britain’s former
Empire, British culture which involves a common law system and a national church, and its
status as an island, which literally and rhetorically separates it from continental Europe
(Kriesi 2020). Much of UKIP’s platform centers on “restoring Britishness” (Sutcliffe 2012,
116). For example, Farage called for a ban of the wearing of the burka, claiming that it
symbolizes an “increasingly divided Britain” and that it is evidence of non-Anglo-Saxon
cultures “being forced on Britain” (Sutcliffe 2012, 116). One UKIP member stated that the
burka is “incompatible with Britain’s values of freedom and democracy” (Sutcliffe 2012,
116). UKIP believes that the EU is a threat to British identity because it “reduces national
control over key areas of national life including immigration and asylum policies” (Sutcliffe
2012, 116).
The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) includes a provision allowing EU member states to
secede. Brexit, which is the popular term for the campaign to remove the UK from the EU,
was UKIP and the UK’s ultimate response to immigration from Central and Eastern Europe.
Brexit is an example of “nationalistic backlash that is expressed by the rise of the radical
populist right in other northwestern European countries more generally” (Kriesi 2020, 5). It is
important to note that in the past, “attitudes about immigration had been largely independent
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of attitudes about EU membership,” but UK citizens grew to associate the two issues together
(Kriesi 2020, 5). This is partly due to the fact that UKIP and the Leave campaign in general
used clearly xenophobic and anti-immigration rhetoric in its campaign effort (Kriesi 2020).
This tactic proved to be successful as most of the people who voted in favor of Brexit
reported that immigration and sovereignty were the two issues that motivated their vote
choice the most (Kriesi 2020). Figure 11 is an example of this, as a UKIP supporter holds
signage encouraging people to vote Leave in the 2016 referendum. The slogan suggests that
UKIP supporters believe that immigrants were invading the UK and encroaching upon British
territory.
In the 2015 election, UKIP ran on a platform that largely centered on getting the UK
to leave the EU as immigration was one of the main issues. UKIP placed second to the
Conservatives with David Cameron as the Prime Minister, who promised UKIP that there
would be a referendum on leaving the EU (Martill and Staiger 2018). This referendum was to
be held in 2016, and the Remain campaign was leading in the polls in much the time leading
up to the referendum itself. However, the undecided voters suddenly shifted to favor Leave.
The Leave campaign won with 52 percent of the vote, compared to Remain’s 48 percent
(Martill and Staiger 2018). As the following maps show, the majority of remain voters came
from working class and rural towns in England and Wales, while the majority of voters in
Northern Ireland and Scotland, two countries that might very well attempt to leave the UK,
voted Remain (Martill and Staiger 2018).
Aligning with the UKIP supporter demographic, leave voters tended to come from
smaller towns and cities in the UK, were less-educated blue collar workers, were older, and
were white. Figure 12 displays two maps of the UK, side by side. The map on the left shows
the UK as it appears normally on the map, with the addition of counties having been color
coded if the county voted to remain in the EU (yellow) or leave (blue). The map on the right
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shows the UK if it was resized according to the number of votes areas counted in the Brexit
referendum. It swells around larger cities such as London. Essentially, Leave voters were the
people who felt most marginalized by socio-economic policies of the left and of the EU
(Kriesi 2020). For example, 63 percent of the British working class were Leave voters, while
just 44 percent of the middle class were (Kriesi 2020). Furthermore, Leave voters’
hometowns might have never had immigrants before, and they had watched as the cultural
makeup of their towns changed as, for example, Polish shops emerged in small British towns
that had not seen much ethnic diversity beforehand. As a result of Brexit, 50,000 fewer
migrants came to the UK in 2017 (Martill and Staiger 2018).
Like the Lega and AfD, xenophobic rhetoric is one of UKIP’s most successful tools to
get people to mobilize. One anti-migrant poster (Figure 13) which was presented by Farage in
support of the Leave campaign was even reported to the police (Stewart and Mason 2016).
The complainant claimed that the poster, which depicts a long line of migrants and refugees,
“incites racial hatred and breaches UK race laws” (Stewart and Mason 2016). The poster
even led Boris Johnson, current Prime Minister and then-head of the Leave campaign, to
distance himself from Farage (Stewart and Mason 2016).
Furthermore, more hate crimes were reported in the UK around the time of the
referendum. In June 2016, the same month as the referendum, police recorded 41 percent
more racially aggravated crimes than in July 2015 (Rzepnikowska 2018). As Polish people
make up the largest block of Eastern European migrants in the UK, much of these
xenophobic attitudes were directed towards them. For example, one of many horrors that
occurred was when a 40-year-old factory worker was punched to the ground and died after
being overheard speaking Polish, while others were stabbed for being overheard speaking
Polish (Rzepnikowska 2018). Profane xenophobic graffiti such as that depicted in Figure 14
is directed towards Polish immigrants. As these events and others like them spiked before and
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after the referendum, one might presume that there is a correlation between the increase in
hate crimes, the Leave campaign’s xenophobic rhetoric, and the referendum overall. When
political leaders such as Farage proudly stand in front of posters such as in Figure 13, it
communicates that people can and should freely act on their xenophobic and racist
tendencies.

Populism and Social Media: UKIP
British politics have often carried an anti-immigrant sentiment, and other parties had
tried and failed to have success that UKIP eventually found. For example, there was MP
Enoch Powell and his infamous “Rivers of Blood” speech, which opposed immigration to the
UK (Yeginsu 2018). Then there was the National Front, which is a far-right extremist group
that vehemently opposes immigration (especially non-white immigration) to the UK (“1975:
National Front” 1975). However, UKIP had a charismatic leader in Farage, and it wielded
what has become one of the most powerful weapons in politics: a strong social media
presence.
Like Salvini, Farage and UKIP have somewhat mastered the art of campaigning and
spreading their beliefs via social media. In the time leading up to the 2014 European election,
which was arguably one of UKIP’s most successful elections, UKIP had more Twitter
mentions than any other party (Perraudin 2014). UKIP impressively is able to source
engagement not just from millennials and young people, but also from older and middle-aged
people (Perraudin 2014). As of November 1, 2020, UKIP has 511,658 followers on Facebook
(doubled since 2014) and approximately 208,000 on Twitter, and Farage has approximately
1.6 million followers on Twitter. Part of UKIP’s social media success is due to the fact that
social media users are more likely to favor anti-establishment figures and to dislike
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establishment politicians, which creates a perfect opportunity for UKIP to swoop in and rally
supporters (Perraudin 2014).
Facebook is what truly granted the Leave campaign its success in the 2016
referendum. Billionaire Robert Mercer, a backer of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential
campaign, owner of Cambridge Analytica, and friend of Farage, used data harvested from
people’s Facebook profiles to target people using personalized tactics such as targeted
political advertisements in order to convince them to vote Leave (Cadwalladr 2017).
Mercer’s donation of these services was illegal as the donation was not reported, but it was
extremely successful nonetheless. As people spent countless hours scrolling through
Facebook, they were inundated with pro-Leave ads that were personally tailored to appeal to
them (Cadwalladr 2017). For undecided voters, this could have been especially convincing.
UKIP and the Leave campaign’s control over the social media realm was a deciding factor in
their win against the Remain campaign.
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Discussion and Analysis
Italy
Time and time again, Italy has felt abandoned by the EU. The migrant crisis merely
put a spotlight on the EU’s alleged failures. As hundreds of helpless migrants capsized,
drowned, and washed up on Italian shores, the judgmental eyes of the world zeroed in on
Italy. For a short while, Mare Nostrum was able to somewhat appease humanitarians.
However, the EU’s cost-effective replacement of Mare Nostrum was less effective with
regards to saving lives, and the Italian government took matters into their own hands and
turned to making questionable deals with Libya (Tassinari 2016). Where the EU failed, the
Italian government was more successful in the minds of Italian citizens. This opened Italians’
minds to the possibility of a more aggressive approach to the migrant crisis and quelling the
flow of refugees and asylum seekers coming to Italy. With Salvini, the Lega finally had the
perfect opportunity to structure its platform in a way that would draw the most support from
the Italian people, as the party turned from being regionally separatist to being openly and
fully anti-migrant and xenophobic. Many Italians who had a small feeling of abandonment
from the EU and a growing fear that migrants were going to take over their livelihoods and
benefits were nurtured by Salvini to fully believe in xenophobic rhetoric, leading to a more
prominent Lega.
Using my understanding of Italian, I perused the politics sections of two popular and
credible Italian news sources: Corriere Della Sera and La Repubblica. Salvini and migration
continue to make the headlines. It also appears that, more often than not, an article about
migration and/or refugees is bound to include a reference to Salvini. Salvini has made himself
synonymous with anti-immigrant politics in Italy. He has tied himself and his party so closely
in with this issue that, despite his trial and not holding as high an office as he once did, he
remains a key player in one of Italy’s most relevant and long-standing issues. As migration
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and borders continue to be a large part of the COVID-19 discussion, Salvini and the Lega
will remain permanent facets of Italian political discussion.

Germany
While Italy and the UK have deep histories with far-right politics, imperialism, and
xenophobia, these historical ties are perhaps most visible with Germany. Hitler’s Nazi Party
is arguably the most popular reference point with regard to extremist politics due to the sheer
level of harm that was done by the party during World War II. Therefore, AfD could be
deemed the most intriguing case as an outside observer might balk at Germany’s growing
relationship with another far-right party. While Italy felt failed by the EU but found some
success in the existing government during the migrant crisis, Germany felt failed by both the
EU and its own government. AfD’s founders had felt abandoned by Merkel years before the
peak of the migrant crisis, so Merkel’s open promise to refugees and asylum seekers was the
last straw and gave AfD something to use to lure voters who had been on the fence about
AfD. Furthermore, the overwhelming number of migrants in Germany, which AfD attributes
to Merkel’s policies, gave AfD an opportunity to instill anxiety and discomfort among the
population. Through this fear mongering, AfD successfully persuaded numerous German
voters that their culture and way of life was being threatened by Germany’s new migrant
population (Decker 2016).
AfD’s xenophobic and Islamophobic advertisements are key examples of how
populist parties seek to instill these ideologies in the general population. AfD and similar
parties use unnerving numbers, such as the amounts of people killed in terrorist attacks for
which the blame can be attributed to the entire migrant population, to make people feel
threatened. If they feel threatened, they will want to do everything in their power to feel safe
again. AfD seeks to represent this safety, sending the message that voters need to vote for a
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changing of the guard in the government so that AfD can enact policy that will eliminate the
threats to their livelihoods. Therefore, AfD was able to capitalize on the EU and Merkel’s
mishaps as well as German people’s anxiety as a result of the migrant crisis to propel their
platform and party to relevancy on both the national (Germany) and supranational (EU)
levels.

The UK
The UK case study is different from the Italy and Germany case studies as its focus is
the migration of Eastern and Central Europeans to the UK rather than refugees and asylum
seekers from the Middle East and Africa. Please note that this does not mean that the UK was
not affected by the Middle East and North Africa migrant crisis or that UK politicians did not
use the migrant crisis to foster xenophobia, but rather that the case of the UK and Eastern
European migrants is unique and requires focused research. Similar to Italy and Germany, the
UK’s history of anti-immigrant politics can be connected to its issues with the EU, which is
made obvious by Brexit. UKIP was also able to capitalize off of the misjudgment of Blair’s
New Labour government of allowing more immigrants from the EU’s new additions to
migrate to the UK than other Western European nations. As was the case with Italy and
Germany, UKIP fostered the feeling that British territory was being encroached upon by
immigrants. This angle allowed UKIP to appeal to the UK’s white, working class population
of English nationals in a way that it had not been able to in previous decades. This is due in
part to Farage’s visibility as a leader. Under Farage, UKIP successfully conflated its migrant
issues with the EU, which, in tandem with social media campaigning, allowed it to realize its
ultimate goal of seceding from the EU through Brexit.
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The data harvesting that worked greatly in the Leave campaign’s favor is also
indicative of how manipulating voters and deluging them with information is necessary for
the success of populist campaigns. In some ways, established and more normative parties
become comfortable in their positions and do not feel a sense of urgency to actively recruit
new voters. However, fringe parties, if they wish to be truly successful, must make a
concerted effort to bring undecided voters to their side. AfD attempted this through their
provocative advertisements. Regarding Brexit, the Leave campaign achieved this through
Mercer’s data harvesting and the implementation of targeted advertisements directed towards
Facebook users (Cadwalladr 2017). The importance of this social media campaigning to the
Brexit result cannot be underestimated as it can claim a great amount of the undecided voters
who went to the polls and voted in favor of Brexit. Therefore, the UK is an example of how
far-right fringe parties must put forth a constant flow of information to instill their rhetoric in
the minds of voters in order to lure them to their party.
Looking to the future as Brexit continues to unfold more than four years after the
referendum, it is possible that Brexit will change the UK beyond its status as an EU member
state. Based on the findings in this paper, it appears likely that Scotland and Northern Ireland
will once again seek separation from England and Wales. While the Leave campaign won,
the vote was not representative of the entirety of the UK; Remain won in Scotland and
Northern Ireland as the tourism these countries had enjoyed by being in the EU was a
significant part of their economies (Martill and Staiger 2018). In the case of Northern Ireland,
the issue once again comes down to borders as the Good Friday Agreement offers Northern
Ireland a clear path to reunion with the Republic of Ireland should Northern Ireland separate
from the UK (Martill and Staiger 2018). Brexit continues to be a perplexing situation
regardless, making it difficult to predict some of its future consequences.
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Final Discussion and Analysis
The findings of this paper have reaffirmed one commonly held perception of the
followers of far-right parties. A substantial number of these parties’ followers can be
categorized as people who feel left behind by their government and the “elites” (Kriesi 2020).
This is in line, for example, with AfD’s use of Merkel as a scapegoat for Germany’s issues
and the migrant wave that AfD’s supporters believe they are drowning under. It is as if AfD
said, “Look at the party and the Chancellor you voted in, look how they have abandoned you
so that they can instead serve people who do not speak the same language as you.” This is a
manifestation of “backlash politics,” which is a phenomenon where voters and politicians act
on a feeling of needing to restore sovereignty and regain control of their own country (Kriesi
2020). As this paper has shown, this is a common phenomenon among the far-right as parties
attract voters in part by warning them that they must take back control from the “elite” who
are changing the face of the country (Kriesi 2020). The migrant crisis allowed this backlash
politics rhetoric to be even more salient, far-right politicians convinced an impressionable
population that they needed to take back control not only from the then-current government,
but also from migrants and the EU.
Europe’s far-right parties, as demonstrated by the Lega, AfD, and UKIP, have
adopted a common language. As this paper has shown, all three parties share the tactic of
fearmongering, which is common among populist parties (Akbaba 2018). This is evident with
all three parties’ campaign posters which link the presence of migrants to terrorism, death,
and invasions. Despite the fact that globalization has made the world increasingly
heterogenous, some people will never not be afraid of those who they perceive to be different
from themselves. Again, this is one way in which migration presented these parties with an
unprecedented opportunity for growth. Europeans had long held anti-immigrant and
Islamophobic beliefs, leaving populist politicians to simply prey on and legitimize this fear
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by villainizing migrants (Kriesi 2020). It is easy to take a single issue such as migration and
make it the lifeforce of a party, to rally people around it and convince them that this is the
most dangerous issue they are facing, that they are fighting a war, and that they must vote the
party into power to protect them. Both migration and populist parties have become
mainstream and inevitable. If reigning governments did yield and completely closed borders
to migrants, populist parties would not disappear, but rather would find another issue to
convince voters they are threatened by. To counter the rise of populism, opposing parties
must circumvent the fearmongering and expose people to facts instead of allowing far-right
parties to prey on their fears.
Italy and the UK’s cases share a number of similarities in particular. Both parties
grew popular under controversial yet charismatic leaders, with Salvini for the Lega and
Farage for UKIP. These leaders are infamous on a greater European or even global scale.
Meanwhile, AfD’s leader is less recognizable and party officials serve to represent the party,
rather than having the party represent them. Furthermore, both parties have heavily relied on
social media to spread their messages, though this is not always done in a wholly legal way,
as we have seen with UKIP. In these ways, the Lega and UKIP had a similar trajectory as
Donald Trump and the emergence of more far-right conservatives in the United States. In
fact, Robert Mercer, the same man who helped UKIP and the Leave Party manipulate
targeted Facebook advertisements to attract voters, aided Trump in a similar way during the
2016 election (Cadwalladr 2017). Trump could even be considered the blueprint for
controversial and charismatic right-wing leaders of the 21st century, as he is by far the most
notorious and internationally known among the growing roster of divisive world leaders. For
all of Salvini and Farage’s success on Facebook and Twitter, it is nothing compared to Trump
and his nearly 90 million Twitter followers. Trump has turned Twitter into a soapbox and a
place for his followers to disseminate xenophobic and far-right ideals.
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AfD, the Lega, UKIP, and Trump’s followers are not the only far-right parties gaining
traction. Leaders whose parties tend to be xenophobic, racist, populist and even extremist
have risen in popularity in assorted nations. For example, populist and nationalist parties in
Hungary and Poland have garnered international attention due to their quick rise to power in
recent months. Therefore, one might wonder if the Lega, AfD, UKIP, and even Trump’s
success is indicative of a global trend toward populism as immigrant populations continue to
rise and give these parties an opportunity to demonize migrants. Still, Trump lost the 2020
election to Democrat Joseph Biden, who earned the highest number of popular votes of any
American presidential candidate in history. Does this indicate that the political left now
recognizes that far-right parties are legitimate threats due to the size of their base, and have
thus been inspired to actively take back power? It will be intriguing to see if European
politics on both the EU and national levels will mirror the American election results in that
populist parties will lose seats. Based on the findings of this paper, I argue that while
European far-right parties may take a slight loss in seats, they will be quick to capitalize on
another issue to ignite their supporters. In 2020, these parties have mastered not only the
rhetoric to use to attract attention and support, but also how to use social media to their
advantage. Trump, Salvini, and Farage are not the only people who have figured out that
posting on social media is the easiest way to inundate millions of people with your own
opinions, whether they are based in fact or not. However, the answer to this question is also
complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which, at the time of writing, continues to affect
every corner of public and private life, including politics.

Migration, Europe’s Far-Right, and COVID-19
Perhaps COVID-19 is the next “threat” to sovereignty that far-right politicians can
spin to reinvigorate their base. Due to the novelty of the pandemic, there is limited research
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regarding the effect of COVID-19 on populist parties. Of course, one of the biggest issues
surrounding the pandemic is borders. Far-right leaders have been quick to point blame at
open borders as COVID-19 has “exposed the fragilities of open borders between states”
(Mason 2020, 1). At the height of the virus’ reign in Europe, the EU completely closed its
borders to foreigners, and other countries on all continents took similar precautions. This left
migrants and asylum seekers in a difficult situation as the borders that were already
incredibly difficult for them to cross became even more restricted. EU member states such as
Greece temporarily halted the asylum process and did not allow access for asylum seekers
(Mason 2020). Furthermore, the pandemic provided some people with fuel for their
xenophobic and racist fire. The virus originated in Wuhan, China, which drew some people to
act increasingly racist towards ethnically Chinese people. Asian people have been publicly
physically and verbally assaulted. Trump has often referred to COVID-19 as the “China
virus” or the “kung flu,” which has been echoed throughout his base and reinforced the belief
among his followers that Chinese people are entirely at fault for the pandemic. One of the
many calamitous consequences of COVID-19 is a surge in racist behavior.
Trump is not the only leader who has weaponized the pandemic to encourage racism
and xenophobia. In early 2020, Italy had some of the highest numbers of COVID-19 cases.
All eyes were on the Italian government to see how it would respond. Salvini was quick to
capitalize on the pandemic and used it to justify his anti-immigrant views. He took to social
media, where he posted a video of a migrant ship arriving in Italy and accused migrants of
causing Italy’s catastrophic outbreak (Kendall-Taylor and Nietsche 2020). Furthermore,
Salvini and other European far-right politicians criticized the EU’s decision to universally
close its borders, citing this move as an imposition on people’s ability to move about freely
(Kendall-Taylor and Nietsche 2020). It seems as though Salvini is only in favor of border
control when it keeps migrants out. However, Salvini’s approval has dropped among Italians
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in the wake of the pandemic. This does not represent a shift away from the far-right; in fact,
the Brothers of Italy party, which is more extreme than the Lega and has direct links to
fascism, has gained popularity (Kendall-Taylor and Nietsche 2020). Note that the strength of
the correlation between this rise and the pandemic is unclear. However, it is possible that the
pandemic will make populist parties fade out and push them to become more openly
nationalist and authoritarian (Kendall-Taylor and Nietsche 2020).
Meanwhile in other countries, populist governments have failed to contain the
pandemic and, unlike in Italy, have pushed voters back towards the center of the political
spectrum. In these cases, COVID-19 has pulled back the curtain on these parties and has
exposed their inability to handle a true crisis. In Germany, for example, Merkel’s CDU is
becoming favorable among Germans again, which could signal the end of days for AfD
(Kendall-Taylor and Nietsche 2020). Then there is the UK, where Parliament passed a bill
that bestows the government with the power to “detain and isolate people indefinitely and ban
public gatherings, including protests, all with little oversight” (Kendall-Taylor and Nietsche
2020). While it is decreasing the power of populists in some nations, the pandemic is also
giving them new opportunities to seize control in others. Looking towards the future, it will
be fascinating to evaluate how these trends continue to develop, and how migration will
continue to be affected by the pandemic even after it has (hopefully!) been conquered.
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Conclusion
The rise of far-right populist parties in 21st century Europe cannot be attributed to
only one cause. Neither the economic crisis nor the migrant crisis alone beckoned European
voters to the far-right. Instead, this issue must be looked at in the context of a larger fabric
made up of the 2008 economic recession, the migrant crisis from the Middle East and North
Africa, the migration of Eastern and Central Europeans to Western Europe, displacement
caused by climate change, and the failures of the EU to address the needs and problems of
member states, which has led in part to an increase in Eurosceptic feelings across the EU.
Furthermore, it is essential to understand that these are not the first far-right populist parties
to exist in Italy, Germany, and the UK, but rather that this is the first time that such parties
have found this degree of success in the 21st century. The Lega, AfD, and UKIP have
managed to find a leader, a party, and the rhetoric to have political legitimacy in their
countries. Additionally, all three of these countries have histories that have been stained by
periods of significant nationalism, populism, and exploitation. The most notable examples are
Italy and Germany’s fascist governments from the 1920s to the 1940s, and the UK’s centuries
of imperialism.
However, the seemingly sudden and overwhelming influx of migrants, refugees, and
asylum seekers in Europe presented the Lega, AfD, and UKIP with an opportunity to
capitalize on. As the research discussed in this paper shows, these parties had enjoyed only
minimal success and legitimacy prior to the migrant crisis. With the migrant crisis and a
heavy stream of Eastern and Central Europeans migrating to the UK, far-right leaders could
fan the flame of anti-immigrant feelings that had long existed within much of the Italian,
German, and British populations. These parties leapt at the opportunity to reframe their
platforms accordingly, and thus made themselves appear to be the potential saviors of their
respective nations from the great threat of migrants. The Lega, AfD, and UKIP relentlessly
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used jarringly xenophobic campaign advertisements, speeches, and social media posts to
cement their platforms in the minds of voters- and it worked. UKIP and the Leave campaign
managed to funnel their energy and new support into a successful campaign to completely
separate from the EU. Therefore, it was the perfect storm of migrant crises, growing
xenophobic views among the general public, and the advent of social media that gave
European far-right parties such as the Lega, AfD, and UKIP the ability to grow and possess a
level of power which had previously evaded them.
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Appendix

Fig. 1. This map shows the number of asylum applications each European country received in
2015, as well as the routes the refugees and asylum seekers take. It is clear that Germany
(DE) received many more applications for asylum than any other European nation, and that
Italy (IT) had some of the highest numbers of illegal border crossings. Source: Wikipedia,
2015.
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Fig. 2. Visual depiction of seats in the Italian parliament’s Lower House won by parties from
the 2019 Italian parliament election. Source: European Data News Hub, August 2019.

Petropoulos 49

Fig. 3. Matteo Salvini speaking on the campaign trail with two Lega campaign posters
surrounding him. The red sign on the wall translates to “Stop the invasion,” while the blue
sign on the podium translates to “Italians first.” Source: umbria24.it, February 2018.
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Fig. 4. A sign posted by Italian neo-fascist movement CasaPound at the port of Trapani in
Sicily, a popular entry point for migrants. The message translates to “Stop immigration. Let’s
defend the nation.” Source: The Guardian, April 2018.
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Fig. 5. Matteo Salvini endorsing President Donald Trump’s re-election campaign by wearing
a “Trump 2020” face mask at a protest in Rome. Source: The Guardian, October 2020.
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Fig. 6. One campaign advertisement promoting the Alternative for Germany’s anti-Merkel,
anti-Europe, and Islamophobic platform. The headline translates to “The tracks left by the
world chancellor in Europe,” referring to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, on whom AfD
and its supporters place the blame for terror attacks in Europe. The text boxes give the dates,
locations, and death tolls of recent terror attacks that had taken place in Europe. Source: Vox,
October 2017.
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Fig. 7. A map of Germany divided by states showing the success of AfD in each state in the
2019 German state election. States which are shaded darker, such as Saxony, saw a higher
percentage of voters supporting AfD in the election. Source: BBC, February 2020.
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Fig. 8. An advertisement from AfD’s anti-immigrant campaign depicting a pregnant white
woman. The text translates to “New Germans? We’ll make them ourselves,” meaning that
native Germans can reproduce to add to the population instead of allowing immigrants into
Germany. Source: Vox, October 2017.
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Fig. 9. An Islamophobic campaign poster that AfD produced for the 2017 general election in
Germany. The text translates to “Burkas? We like bikinis,” referring to the headscarf that
many Muslim women wear. The poster has been vandalized with paint. Source: Vice,
September 2018.
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Fig. 10. This map shows how the EU has expanded over time, from the original member
states marked in yellow to the Eastern and Central European countries which became
member states in 2004 marked in light brown. Please note that Bulgaria and Romania became
member states in 2007, which was the most recent change to the EU’s size until Brexit.
Source: BBC.
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Fig. 11. A UKIP supporter holding signage encouraging people to vote Leave in the 2016
referendum. The slogan clearly suggests that UKIP supporters believe that immigrants were
invading the UK and encroaching upon British territory. Source: Vox, June 2016.
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Fig. 12. Two maps of the UK, side by side. The map on the left shows the UK as it appears
normally on the map, with the addition of counties having been color coded if the county
voted to remain in the EU (yellow) or leave (blue). The map on the right shows the UK if it
was resized according to the number of votes areas counted in the Brexit referendum. It
swells around larger cities such as London. Source: Business Insider, June 2017.
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Fig. 13. Nigel Farage points to a Leave campaign poster which reads “Breaking point: the EU
has failed us all” and depicts a line of migrants and refugees. It incited much controversy and
was reported to the police for breaking UK race laws. Source: The Guardian, June 2016.
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Fig. 14. Profane xenophobic graffiti directed towards Polish immigrants found near a UK bus
stop in 2006. Source: Vox, June 2016.
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